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NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: PROSPECTS FOR CONTROL. Edited by 
Bennett Boskey and Mason Willrich. New York: Dunellen. 1970. 
Pp. xvi, 191. $7.50. 
CIVIL NuCLEAR POWER AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. Edited by 
1'\fason Willrich. New York: Praeger. 1971. Pp. xvi, 124. $10. 
The conclusion of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty1 was 
only a beginning. In some ways, this was apparent on its face. Article 
III called for the negotiation of safeguards agreements with the In-
ternational Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to verify that nuclear 
materials were not being diverted from peaceful nuclear activities 
to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.2 Article IV 
I. [1970] 1 U.S.T. 48!1, T.I.A.S. No. 68!19 (effective March 5, 1970). The treaty is 
appended to both books. As of November 15, 1972, there were seventy-five parties and 
twenty-nine other signatories to the treaty, including several key countries that are 
expected to ratify it in 197!1. For the official United States explanation of the text, see 
Hearings on Non-Proliferation Treaty Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 
90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). For a history of the negotiations, see U.S. ARMs CoNTR.OL 
AND DJSARM.UIENT AGENCY, No. 48, INTERNATIONAL NEG011A.TIONS ON THE TREATY ON 
THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (1969). See generally M. WILLRICH, NON-
PROLIFERATION TREATY: FRAMEWORK FOR NUCLEAR .ARMS CONTROL (1969); Bunn, The 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1968 WIS, L. REv. 766; Firmage, Treaty on 
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 68 AM. J. INTL, L 711 (1969); Willrich, The 
Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Nuclear Technology Confronts World 
Politics, 77 YALE L.J. 1447 (1968). 
2. Guidelines for such negotiations were formulated in 1970 and 1971 by the Safe-
guards Committee of the IAEA (to which forty-seven countries sent representatives) and 
were published by that Agency as INFCIRC/15!1 (1971). See Eklund, Disarmament and 
International Control, 22 !MPAcrs OF SclENCE ON SoCIETY 26!1 (1972); Imai, Nuclear 
Safeguards, Adelphi Papers No. 86 (1972). A substantial number of safeguards agree-
ments have been negotiated on the basis of these guidelines, 
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held out the prospect of increased international cooperation in the 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Article V contemplated future ar-
rangements under which nuclear-weapon States would share any 
benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear explosions. Article VI 
called for good faith negotiations toward cessation of the nuclear 
arms race.8 Article VII encouraged regional agreements to exclude 
nuclear weaponry.4 And article VIII called for a conference of par-
ties in 1975 to review the operation of the treaty. 
Other matters whose subsequent occurrence was known to be 
vital to achieving the objectives of the treaty included: adherence 
to the treaty by the greatest possible number of near-nuclear powers, 
which involves .satisfying such powers that their security, economic 
and political interests would not be impaired by joining the treaty;5 
development of civilian nuclear power in ways consistent with the 
objectives and effective verification of the treaty;6 establishment of 
effective national safeguards systems;7 improvement in safeguards 
techniques and instrumentation; and adequate support of the IAEA 
and its safeguards activities. 
3. The principal forums for such negotiations are the Conference of the Committee 
on Disarmament (CCD) in Geneva; the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly; 
the SALT negotiations, now being conducted in Geneva; and the negotiations scheduled 
to begin on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Europe. For texts of the agree-
ments concluded to date, see U.S. ~s CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, ARMS 
CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS, 1959-1972 (1972). 
4. The one such agreement concluded to date is the Additional Protocol II to the 
Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, [1971] I U.S.T. 754, 
T.I.A.S. No. 7137 (effective May 12, 1971). For a history and explanation by its principal 
progenitor, see A. GARCIA ROBLES, THE DENUCLEARIZAUON OF LA.TIN AMERICA (1967). See 
Robinson, The Treaty of Tlatelolco and the United States: A Latin American Nuclear 
Free Zone, 64 AM. J. INTL. L. 282 (1970), for an excellent legal analysis. See also Hear• 
ings on Additional Protocol II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco Before the Senate Comm. on 
Foreign Relations, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1971). 
5. See UNITED NATIONS, EFFECIS OF THE PossmLE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND nre 
SECURITY AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS FOR STATES OF THE ACQUISITION AND FURTHER 
DEVELOPMENT OF THESE WEAPONS (1968); UNITED NATIONS AssOCIATION OF THE UNITED 
STATES, STOPPING THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (1967); STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL 
PEACE REsEARCH INSTITUTE, THE NEAR-NUCLEAR COUNTRIES AND THE NPT (1972). See 
also UNITED NATIONS AssOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES, SAFEGUARDING THE ATOM: A 
Sovn:r-AMERICAN Ex.CHANGE (1972), 
6. For discussion of the implications of such developments as breeder reactors and 
controlled fusion, see M. WILLRICH, GLOBAL POLITICS OF NUCLEAR ENERGY (1971). For 
background on enriched-uranium technology, see Appendix 2 to THE NEAR-NUCLEAR 
CouNTIUES AND THE NPT, supra note 5. Continuously fueled natural-uranium reactors 
and reactors using highly enriched uranium are both alluded to in Mr. Gilinsky's por-
tions of the books here under review. 
7. The guidelines developed for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty safeguards 
presuppose an effective national system of materials accountability. International safe-
guards do not attempt to provide for the physical security of nuclear materials, which 
is the responsibility of national systems; but the IAEA recently issued some Recom-
mendations for the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. At the November meeting 
of the Atomic Industrial Forum in Washington, D.C., Professor Willrich made a pro-
vocative speech on the latter problem, foreshadowing a book to be published under his 
editorship in 1973, entitled INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS AND NUCLEAR INDUSTRY. See also 
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Nuclear Proliferation: Prospects for Control is a good introduc-
tion for the general reader to these topics. In the opening section of 
the book, Adrian Fisher and George Bunn-two of the chief archi-
tects and negotiators of the treaty-explain its objectives and ra-
tionale, and assess the prospects for effectively limiting "horizontal" 
proliferation, the spread of control over nuclear weapons to addi-
tional countries. Balance is provided by George Rathjens' chapter 
on controlling "vertical" proliferation, the nuclear arms race among 
the nuclear-weapon States. He introduces many of the basic issues 
in the SALT negotiations.8 
Roughly one third of the book is devoted to safeguards. Victor 
Gilinsky's chapter on the nuclear fuel cycle and the military poten-
tial of civilian nuclear power provides a lucid background on this 
subject. Herbert Scoville explains the technical capabilities of safe-
guards, and John Palfrey comments on the extent to which safe-
guards can be expected to provide assurance against cheating. A 
chapter by Lawrence Scheinman on the political hurdle of reaching 
a mutually satisfactory safeguards agreement between Euratom and 
the IAEA illuminates problems that since appear to have been suc-
cessfully surmounted. 9 
Two chapters are devoted to the problem of peaceful nuclear 
explosions. Chapter 8, by David Brooks and Henry Myers, is a much-
needed corrective to the overselling of the Plowshare program.10 
For example, with respect to the stimulation of natural gas by nu-
clear explosives, it points out that, to produce five per cent of the 
current annual United States consumption of natural gas by this 
PREVENTING NUCLEAR THEFr: GUIDELINES FOR INDUSTRY AND GOVERNMENT (R. Leachman 
&: P. Althoff ed. 1972). 
8. See R. McNAMARA, THE E.5SENCE OF SECURITY (1968) (the chapter on "Mutual 
Deterrence" contains the seminal statement of the basic rationale for strategic arms 
limitation); G. RATHJENS, THE FUTURE OF THE STRATEGIC ARMS RACE: OPTIONS FOR THE 
1970's (1969) (for a full treatment of the topic); H. ScovII.LE, MlssILE MADNESS (1970) 
(for a popularized discus.sion). 
9. After prolonged negotiations, an agreement between these two international 
organizations was reached and approved by the governing bodies of each in September 
1972. Formal signature of the agreement by these bodies and by Germany, Italy, and 
the Benelux countries is expected in the near future. 
IO. The most touted application of nuclear explosives for many years was the nuclear 
excavation of a new sea-level canal through the Isthmus of Panama. After intensive 
study by the Atlantic-Pacific Interoceanic Canal Study Commission, extending over 
four years and costing 22 million dollars (of which 17.5 million dollars were devoted 
to investigating two routes for which nuclear excavation had been proposed), the 
Commis.sion recommended conventional excavation of another route. The original cost 
estimate for the most promising route for nuclear excavation was 750 million dollars. 
Based on its study, the Commission raised this estimate to 3 billion dollars, which was 
higher than its estimate for the conventionally excavated route. The report added, 
"Nuclear excavation is not yet a proven construction technique and there is no as-
surance that construction plans and cost estimates based on present knowledge are 
valid." REPORT OF THE An.ANTIC-PACIFIC lNTEROCEANIC CANAL STUDY COMMISSION 174 
(1970). 
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means would require approximately 1,000 nuclear explosions-more 
than the total number of announced nuclear weapons tests con-
ducted in the world to date. Again, for the creation of underground 
cavities to store natural gas, it suggests that another 1,000 nuclear 
explosions would be needed to meet twenty-five per cent of the esti-
mated new storage capacity requirements. The second chapter on 
Plowshare-by Bernard Bechhoefer--discusses possible international 
arrangements to help implement article V of the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty. 
The final section of the book addresses the troublesome problem 
of security assurances, including security guarantees, alliances, troop 
deployments, and dissemination of nuclear weapons (while retain-
ing custody and control)-all of which look toward increased com-
mitments by the United States at a time when this seems hardly in 
the cards. But the chapter by Joseph Coffey points out that shifts in 
perceptions of the threat and changes in emphasis in our military 
doctrine and programs could also help with this problem. In the 
final chapter, Richard Falk considers the potential of undertakings 
to preclude the initiation of the use of nuclear weapons.11 
All in all, this is a good, well-rounded, short work on the many-
faceted non-proliferation problem. It is much meatier than Civil 
Nuclear Power and International Security, which is based on a three-
day symposium held at the University of Virginia in May 1970. The 
three papers discussed there included one by Victor Gilinsky-basi-
cally the same as his paper in the earlier book-on the military po-
tential of civil nuclear power; one by Douglas George and Ralph 
Lumb on international safeguards, which adds some fresh insights 
to the coverage of this subject in the earlier book;12 and a somewhat 
pessimistic view by Leonard Beaton of the prospects for non-pro-
liferation in light of the ever-increasing availability of weapons-grade 
nuclear material coupled with what he sees as the economic and 
political realities. 
Thus, the subject matter of this latter publication overlaps, but 
is far less extensive than, that in the first book. What it does add is 
an edited paraphrase of the discussion of these papers by distin-
guished individual panelists from the IAEA, Euratom, the United 
11. See also Ullman, No First Use of Nuclear Weapons, 50 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 669 
(1972). The only existing treaty containing an explicit undertaking not to use or 
threaten to use nuclear weapons against certain other countries is Additional Protocol 
II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, to which 
the United States and the United Kingdom are parties. See note 4 supra. In November 
1972, the Chinese People's Republic issued and circulated to the U.N. General As-
sembly a declaration paralleling the undertakings in this Protocol. 
12. It should be noted, however, that the safeguards documents set forth in the 
appendix have in large measure been supplanted by the guidelines referred to in note 2 
supra. This also reduces the utility of ATOMIC SAFEGUARDS: A STUDY IN INTERNATIONAL 
VERIFICATION (1971) by Allan McKnight, former Inspector General of the IAEA. 
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Kingdom, the U.S.S.R., Germany, Japan, Canada, Sweden, India, and 
the United States. This record of their discussion may give the 
reader some feel for the various viewpoints represented, but it could 
not do so in anywhere near the depth of the remarkable negotiations 
held in Vienna in 1970-1971, which resulted in a broad international 
consensus on detailed guidelines for the safeguards agreements called 
for by the Non-Proliferation Treaty.13 While the latter was only 
open to official representatives (including some of the panelists), it 
was where the action was, and the Virginia symposium had no dis-
cernible impact on that action. Although the panelists' comments 
in this book do suggest a few lines of inquiry worth further pursuit, 
the first book is far more useful for most readers.14 
Charles N. Van Doren, 
Deputy General Counsel, 
United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 
l!I. See note 2 supra. 
14. For an interesting analysis of the full range of post-war arms control agreements, 
see E. STEIN, !MPACI' OF NEW WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY ON INTERNATIONAL I.Aw: SELECTED 
AsPECTS, 1971-ll ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, R.ECUEIL DES CoURS 223 (1971). 
Among foreign books relating to non-proliferation, G. DELCOIGNE &: G. RUBINSTEIN, NON-
PROLIFERATION DES ARMES NuCLEAIRES ET SYSTEMES DE CONTRC>LE (1970), presents some 
new perspectives on the subject. See also G. FISCHER, THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF Nu-
CLEAR WEAPONS (1972); w. WENTZ, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION (1968) (argument for selec-
tive proliferation, since outlawed by the treaty). 
It should be noted that Professor Willrich was formerly a colleague of the reviewer 
in the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, as were the following other authors 
cited herein: Adrian Fisher, George Bunn, Herbert Scoville, George Rathjens, Henry 
Myers, and Davis Robinson. 
